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tion of actions under zoning regulations and the proper use of referendum.
The lack of analysis of the effect of the provisions of the Eastlake charter on
the people is a significant defect in the decision.
Laws, including zoning regulations, should be enacted for the general
welfare and be applied fairly to the people they are promulgated to serve.
Laws which allow arbitrary results and impede the accomodation of growth
threaten the democratic process more severely than does the elimination of
mandatory referenda which may achieve an exclusionary or illegitimate goal.
In determining the constitutional validity of a law, its purpose and effect on




Civil Rights Act - Section 1981 - Title VII - Reverse
Discrimination - Equal Protection
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 96 S.Ct. 2574 (1976)
T HE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
Transportation Co.' held that Title VIP prohibits racial discrimination
by both employers and unions against white persons upon the same standards
as it prohibits racial discrimination against nonwhites. The Court further
held that Section 19811 is applicable to racial discrimination in private
employment against white persons as well as nonwhites.
In McDonald, petitioners, two white employees of respondent trans-
1 96 S.Ct. 2574 (1976).
242 U.S.C. §2000e-2 (1970), provides in part that:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer... to fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.(c) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization .. . to cause
or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an individual in violation of
this section.
3 Civil Rights Acts, 42 U.S.C. §1981 (1970), provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security
of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like
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portation company along with a black employee, were charged with the mis-
appropriation of sixty one-gallon cans of antifreeze which were part of a
shipment Santa Fe was carrying for one of its customers. Petitioners were
fired by Santa Fe, while the black employee was retained. A grievance was
promptly filed with Teamsters Local 988, representing Santa Fe's Houston
employees, but the grievance proceedings secured no relief for petitioners.
They next filed complaints with the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission (EEOC), charging that Santa Fe had discriminated against both
petitioners on the basis of their race in firing them, and that Local 988 had
discriminated against McDonald on the basis of his race by failing to represent
properly his interest in the grievance proceedings, all in violation of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The EEOC notified petitioners in July 1971
of their right to initiate a civil action in federal district court within thirty
days, since agency process did not secure relief for petitioners. This suit
followed, petitioners joining their Section 1981 claim to their Title VII alle-
gations.
4
The District Court dismissed petitioners' claims under both Title VII
and Section 1981, holding that Section 1981 was inapplicable to discrimina-
tion against whites, and that the facts alleged by petitioners failed to state
a claim upon which Title VII relief could be granted. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the dismissal.5
The Supreme Court's main grounds for reversal were based upon an
examination of the legislative histories of both Title VII and Section 1981.6
As a result of the examination of the legislative histories, the Court con-
cluded that the district court erred in dismissing both petitioners' Title VII
and Section 1981 claims against Santa Fe, and petitioner McDonald's Title
VII and Section 1981 claims against Local 988."
The two principal issues presented in McDonald were: (1) whether a
complaint alleging that white employees were dismissed from employment
based on a charge of misappropriating property from their employer, while
a black employee similarly charged was not dismissed, states a claim under
Title VII, and (2) whether Section 1981, which provides that "[a]ll persons
... shall have the same right ... to make and enforce contracts ... as is
enjoyed by white citizens . . . ." affords protection from racial discrimination
in private employment to white persons as well as nonwhites.8
4 96 S.Ct. at 2576-77.
5 McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 513 F.2d 90 (5th Cir. 1975) (per curiam).
6 The legislative history of the original Civil Rights Bill of 1866 regarding the applicability
of Section 1981 to actions by white persons is discussed in length by the Court. 96 S.Ct.
at 2582-86.
7 96 S.Ct. at 2580.
8 Id. at 2576.
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Turning first to the Title VII issue, the Court reached the conclusion
that petitioners had stated a claim under Title VII. The Court relied heavily
upon Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,9 which did not involve discrimination
against whites, in its interpretation of the scope of Title VII. In Griggs,
black employees at respondent's plant challenged respondent's requirement
of a high school diploma or passing of intelligence tests as a condition of
employment in, or transfer to, jobs at the plant. The Court in Griggs found
that the primary "objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII...
was to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers
that had operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white em-
ployees over other employees."'" Chief Justice Burger stated:
In short, the Act does not command that any person be hired simply
because he was formerly the subject of discrimination, or because he
is a member of a minority group. Discriminatory preference for any
group, minority or majority, is precisely and only what Congress has
proscribed. What is required by Congress is the removal of artificial,
arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers
operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other im-
permissible classification." (emphasis added.)
Griggs clearly points out that the purpose of Title VII was to do away with
all discrimination in employment practices.
Title VII has also been applied to preferential quota hiring cases. In
Watkins v. Steelworkers, Local 23692 plaintiffs, who were black, alleged
racial discrimination because of a negotiated seniority system which used
the principle of "last hired first fired" in making determinations in layoffs.
The court found that there was no showing of past discrimination against
minorities and that the system affected both whites and blacks alike, although
admittedly more blacks were affected by the system. Relief was denied the
plaintiffs because "Title VII was not designed to nurture ... reverse dis-
criminatory preferences." 3
9 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
10 Id. at 429-30.
1"Id. at 430-3 1. See also Ripps v. Dobbs House, 366 F. Supp. 205, 208 (N.D. Ala. 1973),
where the court states in reference to Title VII:
The statutory language makes abundantly clear that an employer may 'not arbitrarily
penalize an employee because of his race, or any other protected characteristic.
12 516 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1975).
13 Id. at 48. In McDonald preferential treatment was not used by respondents as a justifica-
tion for their action. Title VII does not preclude preferential quota hiring as reverse dis-
crimination against nonminorities where such an action is necessary to break the chain of
past discriminatory practices. See Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 423 U.S. 814
(1976). See generally, Blumrosen, Quotas, Common Sense, and Law in Labor Relations:
Three Dimensions of Equal Protection, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 675 (1974); Comment, The Use
of the "Bumping" Remedy to Alleviate Effects of Past Sex and Race Discrimination, 28
[Vol. 10:3
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The question of whether Title VII proscribes racial discrimination in
private employment against whites on the same terms as against nonwhites
had not been directly faced and decided by any of the circuits prior to
McDonald. In Parks v. Brennan4 the court held that a white career em-
ployee of the Department of Labor could seek relief under Title VII where he
had been the victim of reverse discrimination. One decision to the contrary
is Haber v. Klassen,' where the court decided that members of the white
race may not seek relief for racial discrimination under Title VII unless the
discrimination also operated against nonwhites. However, this decision was
later reversed." Furthermore, the EEOC consistently has interpreted Title
VII to proscribe racial discrimination in private employment against whites
on the same terms as racial discrimination against nonwhites.'
The Court in McDonald taking cognizance of these decisions and stating
that they were in accord with the "uncontradicted" legislative history of
Title VII, concluded that there is nothing in the Act that would limit its
application only to discrimination against blacks. On the contrary, Title VII
prohibits the discharge of "any individual" because of such individual's race.'
After stating that Title VII was not limited by its terms to discrimina-
tion against members of a particular race, the Court addressed itself to
respondents' contention that even though Title VII was generally applicable
to whites, it afforded petitioners no protection because their dismissal was
based on a serious criminal offense against their employer.' 9 The Court
rejected respondents' argument, as it was directly contrary to McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green,'" where the Court held that while participation in a
crime or other misconduct may be a sufficient criterion to discharge an em-
RUTGERS L. REV. 1285 (1975). But an absolute preference for any group, minority or
majority, is forbidden by law. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Watkins v.
Steelworkers, Local 2369, 516 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1975); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315
(8th Cir. 1971) (absolute preference held to operate as a present infringement on those
nonminority persons who were equally or superiorly qualified). The use of quotas and
ratios in hiring have been upheld where there has been past racial discrimination, and where
the effect of using quotas and ratios in hiring is not concentrated on an identifiable group
of nonminorities. See Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Serv., 520 F.2d
420 (2d Cir. 1975); Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir.
1974). See generally Note, 42 TENN. L. REV. 397 (1975).
14 389 F. Supp. 790 (N.D. Ga. 1974), rev'd sub. nom. on other grounds, Parks v. Dunlop,
517 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1975).
15 10 EMPL. PRAc. DEC. 10,387 (N.D. Ohio 1975).
16 Haber v. Klassen, 12 EMPL. PRAC. DEC. 11,089 (6th Cir. 1976). But see Mele v.
United States, 395 F. Supp. 592 (D.N.J. 1975).
17 96 S.Ct. at 2578.
18 Id. See note 2 supra. See also 1 W. CONNOLLY, A PRACTICAL GurE TO EMPLOYMENT
OPPoRTUNrrY 8 (1975).
19 96 S.Ct. at 2578.
20 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973).
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ployee, Title VII requires that such criterion be "applied, alike to all members
of all races."
In Green, the respondent, a black civil rights activist, protested vigor-
ously when he was laid off in the course of a general reduction in the peti-
tioner's work force. As a part of this protest, respondent participated in
stalling cars on the main roads leading to the plant at the time of morning
shift change. Later, when his employer was advertizing for mechanics, re-
spondent applied for employment and was turned down on the basis of his
past participation in the "stall-in". The Court pointed out that Title VII
does not permit an employer to use an employee's conduct as a pretext for
the sort of discrimination prohibited by the Act.21 The employee must be
given an opportunity to show that the employer's reason for not retaining
or rehiring an employee was discriminatory.22 Where the employee can show
that any of the employer's employment practices are not applied uniformly
to minorities and nonminorities alike, he probably will successfully rebut the
employer's claim that dismissal was for some other reason than invidious
discrimination.23 In response to McDonald, employers may begin to feel the
urgency of eliminating any inequities in their employment practices.
In deciding whether Section 1981 prohibits racial discrimination in
private employment against whites as well as nonwhites, the Court in
McDonald examined the legislative history of the provision. 4 Respondents
21 96 S.Ct. at 2579, citing 411 U.S. at 804.
22 Id. at 2579, citing 411 U.S. at 807.
23 411 U.S. at 802-05. The Court stated that:
The complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the initial burden under the statute
of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination. This may be done
by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was quali-
fied for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his
qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained
open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's
qualifications. Id.
The Court in McDonald noted that this pattern of proof was intended by the Court in
Green to be merely illustrative of the "most common sort of case, and not as an indication
of any substantive limitation of Title VIl's prohibition of racial discrimination." 96 S.Ct. at
2578 n.6, citing 411 U.S. at 802 n.13.
24 96 S.Ct. at 2581. The Court in McDonald did not present a discussion of the lower
federal court cases which have dealt with the applicability of Section 1981 to reverse dis-
crimination. Cases holding that Section 1981 is not available to white persons: Balc v.
United Steelworkers, 6 Ema,. PRAc. DEC. 8948 (W.D. Pa. 1973); Ripp v. Dobbs House,
Inc., 366 F. Supp. 205 (N.D. Ala. 1973); Perkins v. Banster, 190 F. Supp. 98 (D. Md.
1960). Cases supporting the availability of Section 1981 to white persons: Carter v. Gal-
lagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971); Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co., 408 F. Supp. 916 (S.D. Tex.
1976) (this is the same district judge who reached the opposite view in deciding McDonald
at the trial court level); Hollander v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 392 F. Supp. 90 (D. Conn.
1975); WRMA Broadcasting Co. v. Hawthorne, 365 F. Supp. 577 (M.D. Ala. 1973);
Central Presbyterian Church v. Black Liberation Front, 303 F. Supp. 894 (E.D. Mo. 1969);
Gannon v. Action, 303 F. Supp. 1240 (E.D. Mo. 1969), aff'd on other grounds, 450 F.2d
1227 (8th Cir. 1971).
AKRON LAw REVIEW [Vol. 10:3
5
Williams: McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co.
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1977
argued that the terminology employed in Section 1981, stating that minorities
should enjoy "the same rights ... as is enjoyed by white citizens," unambigu-
ously limited the protection against discrimination to nonwhites. Secondly,
they contended that such a reading was consistent with the legislative history
of the provision. 5 Both of these contentions were rejected by the Court.
The Court in McDonald began its analysis of the legislative history by
pointing out that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was introduced by Senator
Trumbull to protect the civil rights of United States citizens.2 While the
Court recognized that the "immediate impetus" for the bill was to provide
further relief for the former black slaves, it did not construe the language in
Section 1981 to be limited solely to the realization of this goal.2" In reaching
the conclusion that the Senate intended the enactment to apply to both whites
and blacks, the Court made reference to a speech by Senator Trumbull
during the final senatorial debates wherein he emphasized the nonracial
character of the bill.2 With this discussion of the legislative history, the Court
stated that "it was clear that the bill, as it passed the Senate, was not limited
in scope to discrimination against nonwhites."2 "
Next, the Court reviewed the purpose for the addition of the words
"as is enjoyed by white persons" in Section 1981. It is precisely this phrase
that has led to the question of whether or not a white person has standing
under Section 1981. The Court found that in the debates of the Senate this
phrase was treated as a technical adjustment not intended to restrict the
scope of the bill."0
The judge who decided McDonald at the district court level had a
second opportunity to look at the availability of Section 1981 to white per-
sons in Speiss v. C. Itoh & Co. 1 prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
McDonald. In that case, the district court judge pointed out that there were
at least three possible interpretations of the statute when the first phrase,
25 96 S.Ct. at 2581.
26 Id. at 2582.
27 Id. Contrary to McDonald, other sources indicate that the real issue during the debates
was not whether the bill provided the same rights for all persons, but whether the bill would
take away the power of the states to legislate for all persons within their individual borders.
See generally Larson, The New Law of Race Relations, 1969 Wisc. L. REV. 470; Comment,
Private Discrimination Under the Civil Rights Act: In Search of Principled Constitutional
and Policy Limits, 7 TOLEDO L. REV. 139 (1975); Note, 18 DEPAuL L. REV. 284 (1968).
28 This speech was in response to remarks by Senator Davis where he alleged that "This
[was] an act for the benefit of the free negro, not the white man. If there had been no
free negro, this act never would have been heard of .... " CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 599 (1866).
29 96 S.Ct. at 2583.
30ld.
31 408 F. Supp. 916 (S.D. Tex. 1976).
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"all persons", and the second phrase, "as is enjoyed by white citizens", are
considered together. The three interpretations that suggest themselves are:
(1) that the phrase... "all persons" ... contradicts the phrase "as is
enjoyed by white citizens"; (2) that the phrase "as is enjoyed by white
citizens" qualifies and limits the protection of the statute to aliens and
nonwhite American citizens; or (3) that the phrase "as is enjoyed by
white citizens" represents a barometer with which to measure protection
afforded to rights now to be enjoyed by all persons regardless of race
which were enjoyed as a matter of law prior to 1866 only by white
citizens, the group then racially "favored". 2
Without this language there would be no question of whether white plaintiffs
had standing under Section 1981 .1
In McDonald, the respondents contended that the second interpretation
was unambiguously clear, but the Court rejected this argument and attempted
to clarify the ambiguity of the language. While the Court recognized the
immediate impetus for the bill was to protect the freed man's new civil rights,
it felt that the cumulative evidence of the legislative history made it clear
that Congress had a broader intent, which was to provide the same rights
for whites under Section 1981 as are afforded to blacks."4 Thus, it appears
that the Court in McDonald adopted the third interpretation suggested in
Speiss.
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. 5 is another important case in this area
32 Id. at 919. See note 3 supra.
33 Without the phrase "as is enjoyed by white citizens" the statute would read "[A]Il persons
. . . shall have the same right to make and enforce contracts .... ." The judge in Spiess
decided that the phrase "as is enjoyed by white citizens" did not diminish the principle of
equal treatment established by the legislative history.
At most ..... this phrase constituted, in 1866, a comparative instrument by which
to measure the relative protection from abridgment of enumerated civil rights on ac-
count of racial discrimination to be accorded to all persons, including white citizens,
in the exercise of rights then enjoyed solely by white citizens. 408 F. Supp. at 924.
34 96 S.Ct. at 2586.
3 392 U.S. 409 (1968). This decision expressly overruled Hodges v. United States, 203
U.S. 1 (1906) in so far as Hodges was inconsistent with Jones. In Hodges, the Court had
held that the 1866 Act, which penalized citizens who conspired to prevent citizens of
African descent, because of their race or color, from entering into employment contracts,
to be in excess of the enforcement powers vested in Congress by the Thirteenth Amendment,
since "no mere personal assault or trespass or appropriation operates to reduce the individual
to a condition of slavery" Id. at 18. By analogy to Jones, it has been decided that Section
1981 applies to prohibit private racial discrimination in employment. See Brown v. Gaston
County Oyeing Mach. Co., 457 F.2d 1377 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 982 (1972);
Young v. International Tel. & Tel. Co., 438 F.2d 757, 759 (3d Cir. 1971). The United
States Supreme Court has held that Section 1981 affords a federal remedy against discrim-
ination in private employment on the basis of race. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency,
Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975). See also Gilliam v. City of Omaha, 459 F.2d 63 (8th Cir.
1972) (per curiam); Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 450 F.2d 796 (6th Cir. 1971); Caldwell
v. National Brewing Co., 443 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1971); Sanders v. Dobbs Houses, Inc.,
431 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1970).
[Vol. 10:3
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because of the Supreme Court's analysis of the legislative history of Section
1982, which was the companion provision to Section 1981 under the 1866
Act. 6 According to the Court in Jones, the underlying purpose of the Act
was "to secure for all men, whatever their race or color," certain fundamental
rights.3 Furthermore, the Court pointed out that both houses of Congress
were aware that they were approving a comprehensive statute, forbidding
racial discrimination affecting the basic civil rights enumerated in the Act. 8
The Court noted that the Enabling Clause of the Thirteenth Amendment39
empowered Congress to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing
all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States. Hence, Jones may
be read not only for the proposition that Section 1982 granted black citizens
an action against purely private racial. discrimination in the sale and rental
of property, but also for the broader proposition that the 1866 Act was
intended to be a comprehensive statute, forbidding all racial discrimination
concerning the basic civil rights protected in the statute under both Sections
1981 and 1982.
Since the sections were companion provisions, it would appear that
the next logical step from this proposition is the recognition that Section 1981
is also applicable to incidents of reverse discrimination." This is especially
true in view of the fact that the rights to make and enforce contracts and
to sue or be sued are protected under Section 1981 .1
The general problem raised by reverse racial discrimination cases is
whether the government or an employer has overstepped the ideal of equality
for all, which is embedded in the Constitution, in an effort to redress past
injustices against black citizens. 2 Employment is only one area where the
36 392 U.S. at 422-37.
3 7 Id. at 432.
38 Id. at 435.
39 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIII, provides:
(1) Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof
the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or
any place subject to their jurisdiction.
(2) Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
40 42 U.S.C. §1982 has language very similar to that in §1981. Section 1982 provides:
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory,
as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey
real and personal property. (emphasis added.)
In Walker v. Pointer, 304 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Tex. 1969) the judge relied on Jones in
arriving at the conclusion that Section 1982 was applicable to discrimination against white
citizens.
41 See Roberto v. Hartford Ins. Co., 177 F.2d 811 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S.
920 (1950).
4 2 See Comment, But Some Animals Are More Equal Than Others: A Look At the Equal
Protection Argument Against Minority Preferences, 12 DUQUESNE L. REV. 580 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Comment].
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effects of past racial discrimination can be seen. The objective of Congress
in the enactment of Title VII was to achieve equality of employment oppor-
tunities. 3 It has been held that an absolute preference in favor of one group
over another as a method to achieve equality is forbidden by Title VII." An
employer is permitted to use quotas in hiring only where the requirements
set out by the courts have been met. 5
For the Court in McDonald to hold otherwise than it did would have
been contrary to the principle of equality before the law. Such a decision
would have lead to a consideration of the constitutionality of Section 1981.
Note that McDonald is a case of private discrimination which has been
challenged under federal statutes granting a private citizen the right to sue
for private acts of discrimination. Whether a plaintiff has standing to bring
a private discrimination action is determined by looking to these statutes.
Any constitutional challenge to these statutes would be based on the Thir-
teenth Amendment, which gave Congress the power to enact laws for the
purpose of abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery. 8 Nevertheless, the
same basic principle of equality before the law which applies in discrimina-
tion cases involving state action should apply where there is only private
discrimination. Thus, if there is to be a consideration of the constitutionality
of these statutes, the Court would most likely rely on the principles it has
laid down under the Fourteenth Amendment as guidelines.
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that ". . . no State shall ... deny
to any person within its jurisdiction of the equal protection of the laws". '
A recent California case, Bakke v. Regents of Univ. of California,4" dealt
with the issue of reverse discrimination. In Bakke, the Court held that an
admission program, which had not been shown to have previously discrim-
inated against minorities, violated the constitutional rights of nonminority
applicants because it afforded a preference on the basis of race to persons
who, by the university's standards, were not as qualified for the study of
medicine as nonminority applicants who were denied admission. In its an-
alysis, the Court emphasized that classifications based on race were subject
to strict scrutiny where the classification resulted in detriment to a person
because of his race. 9 A contrary decision was reached in Alevy v. Downstate
43 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971).
44 Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 330 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950
(1972).
45 For a discussion of preferences, see note 13 supra.
46See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); Walker v. Pointer, 304 F. Supp.
56, 58-60 (N.D. Tex. 1969).
47 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
48 132 Cal. Rptr. 680 (Cal. 1976).
49 Id. at 690.
[Vol. 10:3
9
Williams: McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co.
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1977
Medical Center,5" where the court did not apply the strict scrutiny test. The
judge in Alevy felt that "it would cut against the grain of the Fourteenth
Amendment, were the equal protection clause used to strike down measures
designed to achieve real equality for persons whom it was intended to aid.5'
In Alevy the white student would not have been admitted even if there were
no special admission policy for minorities. On the other hand, Bakke was re-
manded in order that a determination be made as to whether or not the
plaintiff would have been admitted absent a special admissions policy for
minorities.
Both of these decisions, as well as McDonald, illustrate that it is extreme-
ly important for an employer or administrator to justify special treatment or
conduct towards any individual or group on some basis which does not run
afoul of present constitutional guidelines concerning race. Furthermore, these
decisions are illustrative of the difficulty which the courts have in choosing
an appropriate standard of review in reverse discrimination cases.52 On the
one hand, the courts must recognize that there is a legitimate goal of erasing
the past and present effects of racial discrimination against minorities. But
on the other hand, the courts must consider how these programs, developed
to eradicate past discriminatory practices, affect nonminority persons, who
were not associated with past discriminatory practices. Where the benefits
of a classification outweight any injury to society, the classification win be
upheld.
Some of the objectives that the government has tried to achieve through
affirmative action programs are: (1) to speed up integration; (2) to com-
pensate the black citizens for past discrimination; (3) to remedy the effects
of past discrimination; and (4) to restore the black citizen's sense of self-
worth and personal respect.5" In view of these objectives, the question is
raised as to why these affirmative action programs are being challenged in
the courts today.
First, the recession economy of the mid-70's with the corresponding
scarcity of jobs for even the well-educated has encouraged criticism of these
50 39 N.Y.2d 326, 348 N.E.2d 537, 384 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1976).
51 Id. at 335, 348 N.E.2d at 545, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 89. The Court in Alevy applied a "sub-
stantial interest" test: (1) whether the policy has a substantial basis in actuality, and is not
merely conjectural; (2) whether the scheme furthers some legitimate, articulated govern-
mental purpose, but however, (3) the interest need not be compelling, urgent or paramount,
but rather, only that on balance, the gain to be derived from the preferential policy out-
weighs its possible detrimental effects. Id. at 336, 348 N.E.2d at 545, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 90.
52 For discussion on the question of which standard of review should be applied in reverse
discrimination cases, see Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41
U. Cm. L. REv. 723 (1974); Comment, Reverse Discrimination, 45 Miss. L.J. 467 (1974);
Developments, Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1065, 1104-17 (1962).
53 See Karst & Horowitz, Affirmative Action and Equal Protection, 60 VA. L. REv. 955,
962-66 (1974); Comment, supra note 42.
RECETr CASESWinter, 1977]
10
Akron Law Review, Vol. 10 [1977], Iss. 3, Art. 10
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol10/iss3/10
AKRON LAW REVIEW
programs.5 Secondly, preferential treatment of racial and ethnic minorities
seems to be inconsistent with the nation's rejection of racism and the
espousal of concepts of individuality, merit and self-achievement.5 Finally,
it has been suggested that "preference for the [black] is, in today's world,
discrimination against the members of those groups which are most similar
to the [black]."56
Even though McDonald is a case of an isolated incident of reverse
racial discrimination where the respondents did not allege that they had a
preferential program for blacks, in either cases of isolated incidents of re-
verse racial discrimination or preferential treatment, Title VII and Section
1981 forbid an employer from arbitrarily discriminating in his treatment of
his employees. In the future it will not be enough for an employer to allege
that he is dismissing any employee on the basis of his conduct without show-
ing that he has uniformly dismissed employees regardless of race, sex,5"
religion or national origin, for the same conduct. Thus, McDonald requires
uniformity of treatment for the same conduct. An employer can no longer
disparately deal with his employees according to his own caprice; he must
be aware of how he treats all employees, and he must make every attempt
to avoid any discriminatory practices.
With this decision, white persons have an additional basis to bring
a private action against an employer under Section 1981. This section does
not have many of the procedural prerequisites for bringing an action against
an employer as does Title VII, and failure to meet the requirements of Title
VII will not bar a Section 1981 claim. 8
54 Comment, supra note 42, at 581.
55 Sandalow, Racial Preferences in Higher Education: Political Responsibility and the
Judicial Role, 42 U. Cm. L. Rav. 653, 654 (1975).
56 Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World: Equality for the Negro-The Problem of
Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U. L. REV. 363, 373 (1966).
57 No relief is available under Section 1981 for sex discrimination. Raether v. Phillips, 401F. Supp. 1093 (D. Va. 1975); Thomas v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 392 F. Supp. 373
(N.D. Tex. 1975).
58 Under Title VII the procedural prerequisites include the following: a charge of discrimina-
tion must first be filed with a state or local fair employment agency for 60 days. 42 U.S.C.§2000e-5(b) (1970). Subsequently, a charge must be filed with the EEOC for another 60
days, for conciliation between the parties. Id. §2000e-5(e). The Commission will attempt
to conciliate the parties after it has notified the employer of the charge and after it has
investigated the charge to see if there is reasonable cause to believe the charge. In addition,
the charge of discrimination must be filed within 90 days of the discriminatory act. Id.§2000e-5(a)(d) (1970). Finally, the employer will receive a "right to sue" letter from the
EEOC to institute a court action, and the employee must file the complaint in federal dis-
trict court within 30 days after receipt of the letter. Id. §2000e-5(e). Section 1981 provides
the employee with direct access to the federal district court without having to exhaust
either state or federal administrative remedies. Johnson v. REA, 421 U.S. 459 (1975);
Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971); James v. Ogilvie, 310 F. Supp. 661(N.D. I11. 1970). There has been some criticism of the use of a Section 1981 remedy for a
discriminatory act in employment. See note, 26 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 889 (1976).
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Nor is this decision limited in its application to situations where an em-
ployee is dismissed from his job. Section 1981 protects nonwhite persons'
rights in numerous situations where they are being discriminated against,
including housing. Therefore, it appears that white persons will be permitted
to use Section 1981 as it has been traditionally used by nonwhite persons.
CAROLINE WILLIAMS
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